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The Inadequacy of UK Moral Rights Protection: A 
Comparative Study on the Waivability of Rights and 
Recontextualisation of Works in Copyright and Droit 
D’auteurs Systems 
 
Jonas Brown-Pedersen* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The paper examines two aspects of UK moral rights protection, namely the waiver of rights 
provided for under section 87(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’) 
and the protection of copyright works from recontextualisation, in a comparative study. The 
jurisdictions compared are the UK, Canada, and the Nordic Countries. The paper argues that 
UK protection of authors’ moral rights are insufficient, chiefly due to the operation of section 
87(2) CDPA and the lack of protection against recontextualisation (‘the spirit of the 
Convention’). The purpose of comparison is to furnish alternative solutions existing under the 
same international framework as the CDPA. In concluding, the paper finds that comparing the 
copyright law system of the UK to the Canadian hybrid system and the Nordic droit d’auteurs 
systems reveals a scale from least to most substantial protection of moral rights, with a greater 
emphasis on protection of the spirit of the work in droit d’auteurs jurisdictions, as illustrated by 
Swedish case law. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
International copyright law is, at its very core, a philosophical compromise. This 
is no surprise: it is likely that all large, multilateral treaties are a result of some sort 
of compromise between the philosophical schools followed by different Member 
States, owing to the State-specific nature of law. These differences may turn out 
to have little practical significance, or, as in the case of the 1886 Berne Convention 
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for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (‘the Berne Convention’), the 
practical significance may be substantial. This in itself manifests in the protection 
of the moral rights of attribution (droit de paternité or the ‘right of paternity’) and 
the right of integrity (droit de respect) in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. Moral 
rights, often referred to as droits moraux, originated in the civil law systems of 
Germany and France, and do not sit easily within the common law system of UK 
copyright.1 Therefore, moral rights were not introduced into UK law until the 
enactment of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’), despite 
their inclusion in the Berne Convention at Rome in 1928.2  
This paper submits that the protection afforded to moral rights by the 
CDPA is inadequate for two reasons: (1) because the waiver of moral rights 
provided for in section 87(2) CDPA has the effect of distinguishing the moral 
rights of the author in practice, thus violating Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention on its correct interpretation; and (2) because the protection of the 
right of integrity does not cover recontextualisation, ie the displaying of a work in 
a new context which renders it prejudicial to the author’s honour or reputation. 
Both of these aspects of moral rights protection will be analysed in a comparative 
perspective, contrasting the UK approach with the approaches of the mixed 
jurisdiction of Canada, and the civil law jurisdictions of the Nordic countries, 
defined as including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland. These 
jurisdictions are chosen because they represent, in the opinion of the author, good 
examples of their respective legal traditions. The Nordic countries are 
representative of the droit d’auteurs systems of continental Europe, while the hybrid 
system of Canada falls in between the two extremes, which lends itself well to 
comparison. Only Canadian federal law will be analysed, as, per the Canadian 
Constitution Act section 91(23), copyright law is under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Federal Parliament. The Nordic countries will be analysed together due to 
their high degree of similarity of legislation, philosophy, and practical approach in 
the area of moral rights.3 Significant differences will be commented upon where 
they arise. 
As regards structure, the paper will first define moral rights in a general 
sense and provide a short historical and philosophical background that is 
                                               
1 Silke von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy (OUP 2008) para 3.54.  
2 Gillian Davies and Kevin Garnett (eds), Moral Rights (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 
para 3-005. 
3 ibid para 19-001. 
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necessary for understanding the core content. It will then present Article 6bis of 
the Berne Convention and elaborate on its interpretation and the implications of 
these. Thereafter, the paper will analyse: (1) the waivability of moral rights within 
the above jurisdictions, starting with the UK; and (2) the protection of 
recontextualisation in the same manner. Finally, the paper will conclude that the 
protection afforded to the moral rights of authors is inadequate in both respects. 
To conclude, this paper will also suggest that a likely successful reform of UK 
moral rights can be achieved by borrowing the interpretation of Article 6bis of 
the Berne Convention from the legislation and case law of the droit d’auteurs 
countries.  
 
I. WHAT ARE MORAL RIGHTS? 
 
Defining ‘Moral Rights’ 
Moral rights may be defined as:  
 
[T]he non-pecuniary interests of authors (…) secur[ing] the 
bond between authors and their works; (…) safeguard[ing] 
the expression of the author’s personality through his work 
by giving recognition and protection to his creative 
integrity, reputation and personality.4 
  
This definition is rather broad and encompasses several important 
notions: (1) that the work carries with it the author’s personality in some form; (2) 
that, as a consequence of (1), there exists a personal bond between the author and 
the work; (3) that the work is a product arising from a creative process; and (4) 
that the state of the work has a direct effect upon the integrity and reputation of 
the author. To understand the reasoning behind these notions, we must look to 
the historical and philosophical origins of moral rights. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 ibid para 1-001. 
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The History and Philosophy of Moral Rights through a Comparative 
Perspective 
While it is outside the scope of this paper to present a detailed history of moral 
rights, a short overview will provide context to the forthcoming discussion.5 Stig 
Strömholm argues that the history of moral rights is intimately connected to the 
societal standing and resources of authors and creators as a group.6 As such, it is 
not surprising that the philosophy of moral rights was largely developed in 18th 
century Germany. It coincided with the pre-romantic and romantic periods in art 
and literature, and the Sturm und Drang-movement, which is credited with shifting 
the emphasis from mimesis to intellectual creation.7 This lays the necessary 
philosophical groundwork for asserting moral rights as ‘the expression of the 
author’s personality’.8 In the same time period, German philosophers Immanuel 
Kant and Friedrich Hegel formulated the theories of monism and dualism, 
respectively. Monism advocates that moral and economic rights exist as an 
inseparable unit in copyright, while dualism proclaims that moral and economic 
rights exist separately. The practical significance of this is noticeable in the 
alienability and duration of rights.9 These, however, are not issues pertinent to the 
analysis of this paper. 
It is important to note that, because moral rights developed in the 
continental European countries, civil and common law countries have 
fundamentally different approaches to the basic issue of regulating intellectual 
property. Common law jurisdictions employ the system of copyright, in which the 
overarching goal is the protection, and economic exploitation, of the work.10 This 
is often rationalised in public interest terms, as in the US11 – although it is 
important to note that the UK has no unifying theory of copyright law. On the 
other hand, civil law jurisdictions generally employ a system of author’s rights, 
referred to as the droit d’auteurs systems, the main goal of which is the protection 
                                               
5 For a deeper history of moral rights, see Stig Strömholm, Le Droit Moral de L’Auteur en 
Droit Allemand, Francais et Scandinave avec un Aperçu de L'Évolution Internationale: Etude de Droit 
Comparé (Vols I, Norstedt 1967); (Vols II:1, Norstedt 1967); (Vols II:2, Norstedt 1973). 
6 Stig Strömholm, ‘Droit Moral – The International and Comparative Scene from a 
Scandinavian Viewpoint’ (2002) Scandinavian Stud L 217, 224. 
7 ibid 222. 
8 Davies and Garnett (n 2) para 1-001. 
9 ibid para 3-001. 
10 ibid para 2-002. 
11 US Constitution, art I § 8. 
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of authors. This fundamental philosophical difference is often, correctly, 
perceived to be the root of the UK’s problems in incorporating moral rights. 
Moral rights were introduced in German copyright statutes during the late 
19th and early 20th century. This was around the time that claims by authors and 
creators slowly entered the sphere of France’s private law, as is evident from the 
case law of French courts, though this begins in the early 19th century.12 For the 
purposes of this paper, it suffices to state that the theories of moral rights gained 
ground in continental Europe during the early 20th century, and became a central 
part of copyright protection in many Member States to the Berne Convention. 
As a result of this, four moral rights were proposed at the 1928 revision 
conference in Rome: the right of attribution; the right of integrity; the right of 
divulgation; and the right to withdraw from circulation.13 Of these, only the rights 
of attribution and integrity were adopted, due to objections raised by the common 
law countries against the other two rights. Since then, there have been several 
revisions of Article 6bis, and it is currently subject to a rather significant 
concession made to the common law countries, contained in the latter half of 
Article 6bis, section 2. Against this conceptual backdrop, the paper turns to 
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. 
 
II. ARTICLE 6bis OF THE BERNE CONVENTION 
 
The Text of Article 6bis 
The text of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention reads:  
 
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation. 
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry 
of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or 
                                               
12 See Billecocq v Glendaz Tri Civ Seine 1814 (unreported) in Strömholm (n 5). 
13 Adolf Dietz, ‘The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries’ 
(1994) 19 Colum–VLA JL & Arts 199, 200, 203. 
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institutions authorised by the legislation of the country where 
protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at 
the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not 
provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights 
set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these 
rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained. 
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article 
shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is 
claimed. 
 
Comment on Interpretations and Implications 
The focus of this paper is to make the less-than-subtle point that there is, in UK 
law, a substantial gap between the lex ferenda and the lex lata as regards moral rights 
protection in the UK. Therefore, the interpretation of Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention is vital to the discussion. The essence of this paper’s argument is that 
the lex ferenda proposed here includes provision for the non-, or limited, 
waivability of moral rights and a wider, more substantial right of integrity, under 
the premise that Article 6bis can and should be interpreted in such a way. The 
question turns on two points: (1) whether Article 6bis(1) should be interpreted as 
making moral rights non-waivable, or at least waivable subject to certain 
restrictions; and (2) if the right to integrity contained in the same section should 
be interpreted so as to include protection against recontextualisation of works. 
Although the CDPA protects four rights as moral rights, the rights of false 
attribution and privacy of certain photographs will not be the focus of this paper, 
as they do not exclusively protect authors and are not included as moral rights 
within Article 6bis. 
This paper argues that there are several factors in favour of the limited or 
non-waivability of moral rights. First, the strong philosophical grounding of moral 
rights as intimately connected to the personality of the author suggests that they 
should be non-waivable. Second, the text of the Article 6bis(1), with the phrase 
‘(…) and even after the transfer of said [economic] rights’, implies that they are 
to operate notwithstanding the waiver or assignation of economic rights. Lastly, 
the practical reality of the commercial relationship between author and publisher 
argues in favour of non-waivability, or at least a restriction on waivers. This will 
be seen in the UK part of section III below. 
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The right to integrity has been interpreted differently across the States 
party to the Berne Convention, as we will see in section IV. The reason for this is 
that the right of integrity is ambitious in scope, and was intended to cover a 
multitude of acts and results. The right has two parts, the first being protection of 
the form of the work, ie the physical structure of the work itself, and the second 
being the spirit of the work, which can be defined, for the sake of this analysis, as 
the context of the work.14 The objective of this paper is partly to argue that the 
UK interpretation of the phrase ‘or other derogatory action in relation to’ as it is 
enacted in section 80 CDPA, is too narrow, and offers inadequate protection to 
works covered under the article as it confines protection to the form, ignoring the 
spirit of the work. As Ricketson and Ginsburg note, there is no reason why 
recontextualisation should not be protected under Article 6bis(1),15 and 
recontextualisation is, in fact, often protected under the right of integrity in the 
legal systems of continental Europe. The comparative sections below will 
demonstrate why, and how. 
 
III. WAIVABILITY OF MORAL RIGHTS 
 
The United Kingdom 
Despite the fact that moral rights protection was introduced during the Rome 
revision of the Berne Convention in 1928, the UK did not specifically provide for 
any moral rights regime in domestic law until 1988. The CDPA protects two 
moral rights: (1) the right of attribution; and (2) the right of integrity. It is drafted 
in a very detailed, technology-specific fashion,16 and its Chapter IV on moral 
rights is no exception. Sections 79 and 81 of the CDPA also provide long and 
detailed lists of exceptions to the rights of attribution and integrity. In its entirety, 
Chapter IV created what has been referred to as ‘the sickly children of the Berne 
parent’.17  
                                               
14 Makeen F Makeen, ‘Egypt’ in Gillian Davies and Kevin Garnett (eds), Moral Rights (2nd 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) para 27-013. 
15 Sam Ricketson and Jane C Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The 
Berne Convention and Beyond (2nd edn, OUP 2006) para 10.24. 
16 Gerald Dworkin, ‘The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law 
Countries’ (1994) 19 Colum–VLA JL & Arts 229, 245-246. 
17 Gillian Davies and Kevin Garnett (eds), Moral Rights (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 80.  
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Scholars have listed many shortcomings on the part of the UK in the field 
of moral rights. This paper submits that the primary shortcoming is the possibility 
of waiving one’s moral rights completely, provided for in section 87 CDPA. 
Together with the common law doctrine of implied waiver these serve to 
practically distinguish moral rights. While it is true that section 87(2) states that 
the waiver must be by a signed instrument in writing, section 87(4) also expressly 
states that nothing in Chapter IV shall serve to exclude the operation of ‘contract 
or estoppel in relation to an informal waiver’. The logical conclusion to draw from 
this, is that an author could, in addition to waiving his or her rights formally, also 
be held to have waived his or her moral rights by contract or estoppel, without 
the contract satisfying the formality requirements of section 87. This seems to be 
the legislative intent of the CDPA, as is evident from the Parliamentary debates.18  
In practice, the waiver has the effect of barring authors from retaining 
their moral rights in most cases where the author is the weaker party in a 
commercial relationship (as is often the case, for example, with unknown authors 
of literary works wishing to be published), as the publishing company will assert 
pressure on the author to give up his or her rights.19 While the section 87 waiver 
does not necessarily always violate the Berne Convention, it facilitates such 
violations and provides a weak level of protection to moral rights. In this sense, it 
has been described as ‘completely against the spirit of the Berne Convention’.20  
There is less authority on the operation of informal waiver in copyright 
scenarios, but it still represents a significant weakening of the Berne moral rights 
for the same reasons as above, possibly leading to outcomes in violation of the 
Berne Convention obligations.21 Having concluded that there are flaws in the 
operation and availability of section 87 of the CDPA, what does this mean? 
Arguably, the best way to assess the appropriate standard for which to aim is 
through comparison against other jurisdictions. 
 
Canada 
The federal Canadian legal system is a hybrid. It is predominantly a common law 
system, with the civil law jurisdiction of Quebec influencing its legal philosophy 
                                               
18 HL Deb 25 February 1988, Vol 493, col 1337. 
19 Davies and Garnett (n 2) para 10-033. 
20 HC Deb 28 April 1988, Vol 132, cols 569-570. 
21 Sheila McCartney, ‘Moral Rights under the United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act of 1988’ (1990) 15 Colum–VLA JL & Arts 205, 243. 
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and substantive law.22 In copyright terms, this means that Canada has a significant 
droit d’auteurs tradition, with a history of moral rights philosophy dating back to 
the late 19th century.23 As a result, Canadian legislators, unlike their UK 
colleagues, accepted that the introduction of Article 6bis meant that their 
domestic law would have to be amended after the Convention’s entry into force. 
The Copyright Amendment Act 1931 inserted a short provision into the Canadian 
Copyright Act 1921, which simply stated that authors should have ‘the right to 
claim authorship over the work’, and to ‘restrain any distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of the work (…)’.24 The amendment was silent on most 
matters, including the remedies available for infringement, and the provision was 
generally criticised for being unclear and ‘useless in practical application’.25 
However, the overall image presented by the Canadian history on moral rights is 
markedly more enthusiastic than other common law jurisdictions.26  
The current applicable Canadian law on moral rights and copyright in 
general, is the Copyright Act of Canada 1921, heavily amended by the Copyright 
Amendment Acts of 1988 and 1997, and the Copyright Modernization Act 2012.27 
The rights of attribution and integrity are protected, and it is sufficient for the 
purpose of this section to note that the provisions largely follow Article 6bis of 
the Berne Convention.28 
Sections 14.1(2) and 17.1(2) of the Copyright Act of Canada 1921 provide 
for waiver of moral rights in works and performances, respectively. Authors may 
choose to waive their rights in whole or in part, in writing or verbally. The waiver 
need not be express, but where a party alleges that the author has impliedly waived 
his or her right, there is a high evidentiary threshold to overcome.29 The aptly 
named scholar Professor Vaver has expressed his view on the matter in direct 
terms, which the author considers to be the correct analysis: ‘Moral rights exist 
on the books, but in reality all they may have accomplished is the insertion of an 
extra paragraph in the transfer and sale agreement between the purchaser and the 
                                               
22 Dworkin (n 16) 243. 
23 Davies and Garnett (n 2) para 3-007. 
24 Copyright Amendment Act SC 1931, c 8, inserting s 12(5) of the Copyright Act 1921.  
25 Harold G Fox, ‘Some Points of Interest in the Law of Copyright’ (1946) 6 UTLJ 100, 
126. 
26 Davies and Garnett (n 2) para 25-001. 
27 ibid para 25-003. 
28 Dworkin (n 16) 243. 
29 Auchinachie v Vogel 2007, CarswellOnt 866 Ont SCJ. 
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artist’.30 In conclusion, the Canadian law on waiver substantively mirrors the UK 
law, with the same consequences likely. This leaves the civil law jurisdictions to 
provide us with an alternative approach. 
 
The Nordic Countries 
The Nordic countries are all recognised as droit d’auteurs systems, closely linked to 
the continental French and German approach to moral rights. It is safe to state 
that Nordic legislation on moral rights is uniform, at least to such an extent that 
they may be analysed together.31 The Copyright Acts of the Nordic countries were 
enacted around the same time during the early 1960s, as a direct result of a 
collaborative legislative project initiated by the Swedish Government in 1938. 
Consequently, their provisions correspond with each other as regards to content. 
For practical purposes, reference will be made to the Norwegian Copyright Act 
1961 (‘NCA’).32 The Nordic Copyright Acts recognise the rights of attribution 
and integrity, contained in section 3. The interpretation of the right of attribution 
is not material to this paper, but the right of integrity will be elaborated upon in 
section IV. 
Section 3 of the NCA also provides for express and implied waiver of both 
rights. Importantly, for the purpose of this paper, the waiver must be ‘(…) 
avgrenset efter art og omfang’ (limited in character and scope). This ensures that 
the central elements of the right of integrity are not waived, as changes to the 
work that are prejudicial to the author’s literary, scientific or artistic reputation or 
individuality may often fall outside the scope of the allowed waiver.33 In addition, 
section 3 NCA also states that the author cannot waive his or her right to 
anonymity and his or her right to demand an express statement in or on the work 
where prejudicial changes have been made, making it clear that the original author 
is not responsible for the changes. 
                                               
30 Dworkin (n 16) 245. 
31 Johan Axhamn, ‘The Nordic Countries’ in Gillian Davies and Kevin Garnett (eds), Moral 
Rights (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) para 19-001. 
32 Norwegian name: Lov 12 mai 1961 nr. 2 om opphavsrett til åndsverk m.v. For reference, 
the other Nordic Copyright Acts are the Swedish ‘Lag (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till 
litterära och konstnärliga verk’, and the updated Danish ‘Bekendtgørelse af lov om 
ophavsret (LBK nr 1144 af 23/10/2014)’. 
33 Axhamn (n 31) para 19-030. 
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While the waiver of moral rights is allowed in all jurisdictions surveyed, 
the Nordic model is of a seriously limited character in comparison to the UK and 
Canadian model. The case law on the subject is insubstantial, but the legislation is 
clear enough on the subject for this paper to conclude that the Nordic model of 
a limited waiver connected only to certain aspects of moral rights provides a 
higher level of protection for authors. It certainly has the potential to avoid the 
possibility of commercial circumvention present in Canada (and, by extension, 
the UK), described by Professor Vaver above. 
 
IV. THE RIGHT OF INTEGRITY AND RECONTEXTUALISATION 
 
The right of integrity is a broad right, which covers a great many different actions 
and results. Highlighting its importance, it has been described by Strömholm as 
‘the bastion of moral right[s] (…)’.34 It is interpreted differently across different 
jurisdictions. While the interpretation in each of the jurisdictions discussed here 
is touched upon, a more detailed analysis of the right is outside the scope of this 
paper. We will here concentrate on describing the right of integrity, and analysing 
its interpretation as regards the recontextualisation of original works. 
 
The United Kingdom 
The right of integrity is provided for in section 80 CDPA, entitled ‘Right to object 
to derogatory treatment of work’. In essence, the author of any literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work, or the director of a film can object to the derogatory 
treatment of their work. The terms ‘treatment’ and ‘derogatory’ are described in 
section 80(2) of the CDPA; section 80(2)(a) provides that ‘treatment’ under the 
act is ‘any addition to, deletion from or alteration to or adaption of the work, other 
than’ translations and arrangements of dramatic or literary works or transcriptions 
of musical work constituting minor changes. Section 80(2)(b) states that a 
treatment is ‘derogatory’ where it ‘amounts to distortion or mutilation of the work 
or is otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director 
(…)’. Whether treatment is ‘prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author’ 
is decided by a test of objective reasonableness,35 and it is not enough that the 
                                               
34 Strömholm, ‘Scandinavian Viewpoint’ (n 6) 240. 
35 Tidy v Trustees of the Natural History Museum EIPR D-81 [1996]. 
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author him or herself is of this opinion.36 This places the threshold for holding a 
violation of the right of integrity higher than that of Canada, as shown below. It 
is submitted that when defining treatment in section 80(2)(a), the UK Parliament 
did not properly account for the wording of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 
and defined ‘treatment’ in a too narrow sense.  
It will be remembered that Article 6bis(1) contains the phrase ‘or other 
derogatory action in relation to the work’ in its description of the right of integrity. 
This was clearly done to include actions that do not fit the narrow definition of 
physically altering the copyrighted work, but which may be just as damaging or 
objectionable. Any such action will fall outside the scope of the CDPA right of 
integrity.37 In this respect, the UK falls short of its obligations under the Berne 
Convention, and the protections the UK provides are open to criticism on this 
ground.  
  
Canada 
The Canadian right of integrity is similar in content to the UK right, with sections 
14 and 28 of the Copyright Act of Canada 1921 giving authors the right to object 
to distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work that is ‘prejudicial to 
the author’s honour or reputation’. It is worth noting here that the ‘honour or 
reputation’ requirement is similarly worded in UK and Canadian law, but 
interpreted somewhat differently, as Canadian law applies a test mixing subjective 
and objective criteria, whereas UK law subjects the same requirement to a purely 
objective test.38 This lowers the evidentiary burden somewhat for the author, and 
correspondingly strengthens the protection given to authors under the right. 
However, it does not make the Canadian integrity right entirely different from its 
UK counterpart. 
As in UK law, recontextualisation is not protected under Canadian law, as 
section 28.2(3) of the Copyright Act 1921 provides for several actions which do 
not constitute an infringement. This includes common recontextualisations such 
as changing the location of the work and the physical means for displaying it. The 
likely result of this is that recontextualisation in most cases would not be covered 
under Canadian law, despite Article 6bis, in the author’s opinion, providing for 
                                               
36 Pasterfield v Denham [1999] FSR 168. 
37 Dworkin (n 16) 249-250. 
38 cf Snow v The Eaton Centre 1982, 70 CPR 105 with Pasterfield v Denham [1999] FSR 168. 
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just that. Once again, a review of civil law jurisdictions is required to find stronger 
protection of moral rights. 
 
The Nordic countries 
The definition of the right of integrity in Nordic jurisdictions, as in s 3 NCA,39 
differs from the Canadian and UK approach. An action is only an infringement 
of the right if it is prejudicial to the author’s literary, scientific or artistic reputation 
or individuality, meaning that (1) the infringing action need not be derogatory, 
defamatory or the like;40 and (2) that because of the individuality requirement, the 
infringement can include acts which constitute ‘improvements’ on the work in 
question.41 Note that this is assessed objectively.42 This right of integrity is, prima 
facie, considerably more generous towards authors than its UK or Canadian 
counterparts, but what does this mean with regards to recontextualisation of 
works? 
Plainly, recontextualisation of a work, where this is prejudicial to the 
author’s reputation or individuality, is an infringement of his or her right of 
integrity. Two Swedish cases from the Stockholm Courts showcase the Nordic 
approach. In the first case, the Court held that the inclusion of a religious song in 
a film scene showing an intimate couple was an infringement of the author’s right, 
as it impinged upon his artistic individuality.43 The second case regarded the 
exhibiting of the claimant’s artwork next to highly pornographic photographs, 
which was held by the Stockholm District Court to amount to a context that 
prejudiced the author’s reputation or individuality.44 While the test for 
determining whether the author’s reputation or individuality has been infringed is 
objective, it is noteworthy that the Stockholm courts have, in the above cases, 
taken an approach where the author’s subjective interpretation of the 
infringement has been accorded some weight.  
Upon analysis of the above material, the conclusion on recontextualisation 
must be that the Nordic approach, here represented by the Swedish interpretation 
in case law, offers a more substantial level of protection for authors. This 
                                               
39 See Norwegian Copyright Act 1961. 
40 Strömholm, ‘Scandanavian Viewpoint’ (n 6) 240. 
41 ibid 241. 
42 ibid 243. 
43 NIR 1971 s 219. 
44 NIR 1974 s 187. 
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protection of the spirit, in addition to the form of the work, can rightly be 
described as a more whole-hearted incorporation of the Berne Convention’s 
Article 6bis.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As noted at the outset of this paper, the incorporation of international obligations 
into domestic law is not without its troubles, be they conceptual, practical or 
merely political in nature. The UK’s incorporation of the Berne Convention’s 
Article 6bis in the CDPA has certainly demonstrated this in several ways, both as 
regards waiver of moral rights and the narrow interpretation given to the right of 
integrity under the CDPA. The common theme, manifest throughout the 
comparison, is the tendency of civil law jurisdictions to provide more generous 
versions of the same moral rights, and for Canada to situate itself in between these 
two extremes. This is not surprising, given the philosophical history of moral 
rights, but it is interesting given the fact that the UK has a strong international 
obligation to provide moral rights protection to nationals of Berne member states. 
The above analysis demonstrates that the UK is currently not fulfilling these 
obligations to the best of its ability. In the words of McCartney, the rights 
provided for are ‘(…) well below the Berne Convention standard’.45 
The results of our comparison perpetuate the prevailing view among legal 
scholars, namely that the copyright systems are hesitant to provide full protection 
of rights that they perceive to be foreign and alien. This is reinforced by the fact 
that the UK, Canada and the Nordic countries appear to be a sliding scale from 
the lowest to the highest level of protection. Evidently, the hybrid system of 
Canada makes the process of adapting to droit d’auteurs rules easier.  
The hesitancy demonstrated by the UK legislature when enacting the 
CDPA created sub-standard rights that are not in compliance with Article 6bis, 
and that in order to correct this, any hesitancy must be done away with. In 
proposing a lex ferenda for the UK to aspire to, the author would look to the droit 
d’auteurs systems of continental Europe – simply because, when incorporating droit 
d’auteurs rights into a copyright system, the right path to upholding international 
obligations under the Berne Convention is taking an interpretative cue from the 
conceptual experts.  
                                               
45 McCartney (n 21) 245. 
